Markets must form inside the attention window
A Pump proposal exists to convert an active narrative into a tradeable condition before the attention window closes.
Read Gougoubi’s Pump prediction market design and PBFT prediction market mechanics.
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Pump prediction markets are designed for topics that spread quickly, price quickly, and lose relevance quickly. The market therefore has to open fast, produce a usable price, and still close on a verifiable result.
This whitepaper starts from that operating reality. It explains how a live narrative becomes a condition, how capital enters the market, how fees and rewards are released, and which roles bear the cost when settlement is wrong.
Pump Market Blueprint
Primary product
Pump prediction
Whitepaper, routing, and creation flow now start from Pump markets.
Market unit
Condition
Each condition is a standalone binary market with its own timing and payout path.
Settlement frame
Committee + dispute
Listing can stay fast because final release still depends on verification.
Operating goal
Short cycle
Capture attention, open a market, trade, verify, settle, and move on.
Product Thesis
The starting point is not governance elegance but market timing. A topic remains tradeable for only a short window; users require an immediate price, while capital remains only if the market can later produce a credible result.
A Pump proposal exists to convert an active narrative into a tradeable condition before the attention window closes.
The market must quote immediately. That is why initial pool size and virtual reserves matter more than theoretical market completeness.
Committee stake, dispute bonds, and penalty paths remain necessary because Pump should be fast at listing, but expensive to settle dishonestly.
Market Formation
Each stage exists to answer one operational question: can a live topic become a settled market quickly enough to matter, without losing accountability at exit?
1. Topic capture
The proposal packages the narrative, image, tags, and condition framing while distribution is still active.
2. Condition launch
Each condition becomes the actual market unit, with its own deadline, dispute window, opening depth, and evidence surface.
3. Community trading
Trading forms a public probability, while community activity keeps distribution, conviction, and wallet participation aligned.
4. Adjudication and recycle
Winners, creator fees, committee rewards, and penalties are released only after the result path is completed, so the next cycle begins from a closed market rather than an unresolved one.
Capital Logic
Pump is not a generic fee machine. It is a capital-routing structure for short-cycle markets. It works only when every role understands what it spends, what it may earn, and what happens when it is wrong.
The figures below follow the current public Pump contract constants in MarketPumpFactory, MarketPumpProposal, and MarketPumpCondition. Pump market numbers and governance / dispute numbers are shown separately so the economic model stays precise.
Proposal min stake: 10 狗狗币
Default initial pool: 10,000 狗狗币
Minimum initial pool: 100 狗狗币
Trading fee: 0.30%
Sell fee: 1.00%
Committee redeem fee: 1.00%
Winner redeem fee: 0.30%
Governance seats: top 21 stakers
Minimum settlement bond: 100 狗狗币
Dispute bond: must match that condition’s locked settlement bond
Dispute window: set per condition at creation time
Bond split on final ruling: 30% committee side / 70% winner side
The trader is the first explicit bearer of market risk. Buying YES or NO is the mechanism through which private conviction becomes public price.
Spends capital immediately
Wins only if final outcome agrees
Feels poor depth first and hardest
The creator is not merely a publisher. In Pump, the creator operates the opening market surface through the initial pool and earns trading-fee cash flow only if the market completes settlement.
Initial pool sets the opening surface
Virtual reserves keep quoting alive
Creator fees unlock only after SETTLED
Verification roles are compensated because they perform the step speculation cannot complete on its own: turning a hot market into a final market.
Activation authority
Settlement authority
Dispute authority with stake at risk
Trading fees
Buy and sell fees first accumulate inside the condition as creator trading fees. They do not leave the market immediately and become claimable only after the market reaches final settlement.
Redeem fees
Committee-side and winner-side redeem fees exist because the final release of capital should compensate the actors that completed verification and made settlement credible.
Penalty flow
Dispute loss, wrong settlement, and absent verification remove stake from the wrong side and redirect value toward the actors that preserved result quality.
The objective is not to decorate the market with tokenomics language. It is to show, stage by stage, who commits capital, who locks stake, which flows remain deferred, and under what conditions value is finally released.
Consume
The proposer commits listing effort, distribution timing, and the minimum proposal stake in order to publish a market while the topic is still live.
Earn
At this stage there is no immediate cash extraction. What is obtained is the right to operate a market that may later attract trading flow.
Consume
Traders commit principal immediately. The creator commits opening inventory through the initial pool and virtual reserve assumptions so that the market can quote while attention is still active.
Earn
Traders earn only if the final outcome matches their side. The creator earns trading-fee revenue only if real volume appears and the market reaches final settlement.
Consume
The proposal committee and the supreme side commit time, judgement, and locked stake in order to move the market from speculation into a result-bearing state.
Earn
Redeem-side fee flow exists because verification is not free labour. It is the part of the system that makes capital release legitimate inside the protocol.
Consume
A challenger must post real bond capital, and the supreme side must assume responsibility for either continuing or overturning the proposed result.
Earn
A correct challenge can recover bond and participate in dispute-side reward. A bad challenge is supposed to lose money rather than farm attention.
Consume
At closeout, the protocol identifies the losing side. Wrong traders lose principal, wrong verifiers lose stake, and inactive actors lose the right to extract value from the market.
Earn
Only after this point do winners redeem, creators withdraw deferred trading-fee revenue, committees claim verification-side reward, and penalty flows redistribute toward the actors that preserved result quality.
Settlement Guardrails
The primary design challenge is not listing speed but preventing fast markets from becoming cheap unresolved markets. The rails exist to delay release, not formation.
Committee minimum stake stops no-cost listing theatre.
Settlement deadlines and timeout penalties punish passive committees.
Dispute bonds make challenges expensive enough to filter spam.
Supreme review exists for the scenarios where pump attention outruns committee reliability.
Initial pool and virtual reserves make the market tradable early, but no one should extract final value before verifiable settlement.
Distribution Path
A Pump-first product cannot continue to speak like a generic protocol portal. Navigation, copy, routing, and community surfaces should assume Pump discovery as the default user journey.
Use /premarket/proposals/pump as the default exploration surface for this narrative.
Use /premarket/proposals/create/pump as the creation CTA, not the generic proposal path.
Treat community and activity streams as part of market distribution, not just ancillary tabs.
Pump-first CTA
The whitepaper should move users toward pump proposal discovery and pump market creation instead of leaving them in a generic documentation dead end.